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I. INTRODUCTION
Countries that share borders inevitably encounter issues with each other.
The United States and Mexico, however, face a uniquely complicated issue:
United States federal officers standing in United States territory have shot 
and killed individuals standing in Mexican territory, generating much
tension between the United States and Mexico.1 Some believe that a remedy
for cross-border incidents is best addressed through litigation in United 
States federal courts, particularly through common law causes of action that 
afford monetary compensation based on claims of constitutional violations.2 
This issue was recently addressed in part by the United States Supreme 
Court.3 
Nonetheless, there are numerous issues associated with seeking a remedy 
for cross-border violence through claims of constitutional violations in
United States federal courts. This Comment argues that the most viable remedy
for individuals affected by cross-border violence is not through claims of 
constitutional violations, but through United States legislative action.
Part II explains the international nature of cross-border shootings and 
specifies why the issue is of major importance to United States-Mexico 
relations. Part III explains the shortcomings of current United States and
international laws in a manner far more extensive than the Supreme Court’s
recent discussion on providing an adequate remedy for affected parties.
Given the shortcomings of current laws and the necessity for an adequate 
solution, Part IV explains how legislation in the United States should provide
for a remedy that resembles the right that protects individuals from excessive
use of force under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CROSS-BORDER INCIDENTS
International migration has exponentially risen for nearly two decades.4 
The number of migrants worldwide reached 258 million in 2017, an increase
1. See Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 2018). 
2. The ABCs of Cross-Border Litigation in the United States, CROWELL MORING, 
https://www.crowell.com/files/ABC-Guide-to-Cross-Border-Litigation_Crowell-Moring.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8WSP-8CPZ].
3.  Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020). 
4. U.N. Dep’t of Int’l Econ & Soc. Affairs, Int’l Migration Rep., at 4, U.N. Doc.
ST/ESA/404 (2017). 
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from 173 million in 2000.5 From 2000 to 2017, North America experienced 
an annual migration growth rate of 2.1%.6 Although North America’s 
migration growth rate is smaller than other continental regions, the United 
States hosted 49.8 million migrants as of 2017, making it the largest 
destination country for migrants and surpassing the second largest migrant 
destination country by over 37 million people.7 Within North America, 
the United States and Mexico share a unique relationship with respect to 
migrant populations. The United States hosted 98% of all Mexican-born 
individuals living abroad as of 2017, amounting to 9.4 million people.8 
The United States and Mexico share amicable relations in numerous 
respects. The countries are symbiotic trade partners, as Mexico is the United 
States’ second-largest export market and third-largest trading partner.9 
The countries also rely on each other for national security by sharing resources 
and information to combat transnational organized crime.10 Perhaps most
notably, the countries also share a strong cultural connection with one 
11 another.
Amicableness aside, the unique migratory relationship and increasing 
migration numbers between the United States and Mexico has imposed 
sociopolitical pressure on the United States to enact stringent border 
enforcement measures. The United States recently faced the highest levels 
of migration at its southern border in over a decade with more than 76,000 
migrants crossing the border without government authorization in February 
2019 alone.12 The United States Border Patrol also apprehended 133,000 
migrants in May 2019, the highest monthly total since May 2006.13 United 
5. Id.
 6. Id. at 5–6. 
7. Id. at 6. 
8. Id. at 14. 
9. U.S. Relations with Mexico, U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/u-s-
relations-with-mexico/ [https://perma.cc/62WJ-E43M]. 
10. Id.
 11. See, e.g., Cecilia Ballí, Two Cities, Two Countries, Common Ground, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/05/travel/nogales-arizona-mexico-border.html
[https://perma.cc/N9RK-6K8F]; Julián Aguilar, From Museums to Mountains, Pride and 
Patriotism, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/06/travel/ 
juarez-el-paso-border.html?module=inline [https://perma.cc/5QC2-VAKP].
12.  Caitlin Dickerson, Border at ‘Breaking Point’ as More Than 76,000 Unauthorized 
Migrants Cross in a Month, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/05/ 
us/border-crossing-increase.html [https://perma.cc/F7D8-U22R]. 
13. RANDY CAPPS ET AL., FROM CONTROL TO CRISIS: CHANGING TRENDS AND POLICIES
RESHAPING U.S.-MEXICO BORDER ENFORCEMENT 1 (Migration Policy Institute 2019). 
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States border enforcement officials describe the current migration situation 
as a “humanitarian crisis” that has reached its “breaking point.”14 The
source of this crisis is considered to be sociopolitical instability among several 
Central American countries.15 Guatemalans, Hondurans, and Salvadorans
represented 74% of apprehensions, or 688,000 apprehensions, at the southern 
16 border during the first nine months of fiscal year 2019.
The United States government’s response to the southern border crisis 
has been severe. Under President Donald Trump’s administration, border 
enforcement efforts have considerably increased compared to past presidential
administrations.17 Among these efforts are demands for expansion of border
walls along the United States’ southern border, increased deployment of 
border enforcement officers to the southern border, restriction of asylum 
qualification, increased prosecutions for unauthorized migrants, construction 
of temporary tent-facilities to alleviate overcrowded detainment facilities 
due to increased numbers of detainees, and systematic separation of migrant 
families due to implementation of a “zero-tolerance” policy of criminally 
prosecuting migrants.18 Because of pressure exerted by the Trump 
administration, Mexico has initiated its own efforts to curtail migrants 
entering its southern border from Central America.19 The Guatemalan 
government also recently engaged in joint efforts with United States 
Immigrations Customs and Enforcement to thwart crossings into Mexico 
in order to prevent migrants from eventually reaching the United States.20 
Although the predominant country of origin of recent migrant groups is 
not Mexico,21 the use of the United States-Mexico border as a crossing 
point by migrants has negatively strained relations between the United 
States and Mexico. Recent forceful border enforcement measures and policies 
are contentious, as evidenced by the extensive litigation in the United 
14. Dickerson, supra note 12. 
15. CAPPS ET AL., supra note 13, at 12. 
16. Id. at 9. 
17. Border enforcement is largely considered to be subject to executive discretion.
John Gramlich, How Border Apprehensions, ICE Arrests and Deportations Have Changed 
Under Trump, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/ 
2020/03/02/how-border-apprehensions-ice-arrests-and-deportations-have-changed-under-
trump [https://perma.cc/G2TB-7YNT].
18. CAPPS ET AL., supra note 13, at 5.
19. Miriam Jordan & Kirk Semple, A Sharp Drop in Migrant Arrivals on the Border: 
What’s Happening?, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/10/us/
border-migrants-remain-mexico.html?searchResultPosition=6 [https://perma.cc/BY65-2P37]. 
20. Sonia Perez, Guatemala Sweeps Up Migrant Group, Returns Them to Border, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 16, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/0a23a98b852f041585fe8 
59591615850#:~:text=EL%20CINCHADO%2C%20Guatemala%20(AP),a%20%E2%80
%9Ccaravan%E2%80%9D%20with%20hopes%20of [https://perma.cc/892R-VLR2].
21. Dickerson, supra note 12. 
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States regarding such measures and policies.22 Mexico’s foreign minister
has repeatedly called for investigations into the United States’ conduct at 
the countries’ shared border.23 United States border agents have also used
deadly force forty-three times since 2007 resulting in ten deaths,24 and fired 
tear gas into Mexico from United States territory.25 The growing tensions
related to border enforcement are recognized by both governments, prompting 
them to create a bilateral council to investigate and mitigate cross-border 
violence26 and formally discuss the use of force at the border.27 The impact 
of the United States’ border enforcement practices also extends beyond 
the United States and Mexico, with United Nations figureheads expressing 
their condemnation of these practices.28 
With tensions rising, issues related to cross-border enforcement should 
be met with a solution that addresses the root of concerns, while considering 
the challenges created by the international nature of the issue. An apparent 
issue for international plaintiffs is having sufficient standing for a lawsuit 
because such plaintiffs are often not United States citizens suing for conduct 
that affected them on international soil. Foreign parties have recognized
constitutional protections when they enter United States territory,29 but it
is debated whether or not they have constitutional protection outside of 
United States territory.30 Thus, issues related to standing arise when a
22. CAPPS ET AL., supra note 13, at 23–24. 
23. Susan Heavey & Lizbeth Diaz, Mexico Calls for ‘Full Investigation’ of U.S. Tear 
Gas at Border, REUTERS (Nov. 26, 2018, 5:26 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-immigration/mexico-calls-for-full-investigation-of-us-tear-gas-at-border-idUSKCN1 
NV1MU [https://perma.cc/FYC6-A2UF].
24. Memorandum from Michael J. Fisher, Chief, United States Border Patrol, to All 
Personnel of United States Custom and Border Patrol (Mar. 7, 2014), https://www.cbp. 
gov/sites/default/files/documents/Use%20of%20Safe%20Tactics%20and%20Techniques.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G6TX-SZS5].
25.  Heavey & Diaz, supra note 23. 
26. Written Testimony for a House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 
Hearing, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/09/09/
written-testimony-dhs-southern-border-and-approaches-campaign-joint-task-force-west 
[https://perma.cc/7BWL-LT9W].
27. Joint Statement on the U.S.-Mexico Bilateral High Level Dialogue on Human 
Rights, Mex.-U.S., Oct. 27, 2016, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/10/2637 
59.htm [https://perma.cc/VP9W-ZU59].
28. Nick Cummings-Bruce, U.N. Rights Head ‘Shocked’ by Treatment of Migrant 
Children at U.S. Border, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/08/world/
americas/michelle-bachelet-unhcr-migrants-border.html [https://perma.cc/KL6Z-T5FL].
29. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990). 
30. See id. at 272–73; Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 719 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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foreign party sues for conduct that affected them outside of United States
territory—including injuries sustained in Mexico by a United States Border
Patrol officer. 
Nonetheless, escalated border enforcement tactics, and more specifically
cross-border shootings, have prompted foreign parties to sue in United
States federal courts for remedies.31 Perhaps the most popular remedy that 
parties seek is through the use of Bivens claims.32 In Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, a United States Supreme
Court case which serves as the namesake of the term “Bivens claims,” the 
Court held that individuals have standing to bring a civil cause of action 
for money damages or injunctive relief against federal agents for 
unconstitutional conduct.33 Since Bivens, federal courts have extended the
availability of Bivens claims to foreign parties who allege constitutional 
violations along and beyond the United States-Mexico border.34 
However, the Supreme Court recently ruled that Bivens claims cannot
be used for cross-border incidents.35 In any event, even if the Court had 
created a remedy for cross-border incidents, it is far from certain that foreign 
parties would be ensured a consistent, durable remedy for such injuries on 
the basis of a common law ruling. Court-created remedies are limited in 
scope and subject to reversal. Also, the recent ruling in Hernandez v. Mesa 
hinted at the potential of eliminating Bivens claims altogether.36 
The reluctance of courts to extend Bivens claims to a cross-border 
context and the potential futility of a court-sourced remedy points to the
impetus of ensuring that foreign parties have the ability to seek remedy
for excessive force in cross-border incidents. While federal officers tend 
to have much discretion in their operations due to its relation to national
security, the United States should ensure that some remedy is available
for foreign parties to bring action for claims of excessive use of force. 
Enabling foreign parties to sue does not conflict with the view that the 
United States government has an interest in border enforcement and in
preserving national security. Rather, facilitating the availability of remedies
for cross-border incidents would merely ensure that a remedy is available
31. Debra Cassens Weiss, Supreme Court Bars Damages Suit for Border Agent’s
Cross-Border Shooting that Killed Mexican Teen, ABA J. (Feb. 25, 2020, 12:01 PM), 
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/supreme-court-bars-damages-suit-for-border-
agents-cross-border-shooting-that-killed-mexican-teen [https://perma.cc/339A-SZ9H]; see
also, e.g., Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 727. 
32. See Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 739 (2020). 
33. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 390–91 (1971). 
34. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 719. 
35. Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 739. 
36. Id. at 751 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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to foreign parties when border enforcement efforts entail an excessive use
of force. 
Further, guaranteeing the availability of a remedy for foreign parties
would ensure better diplomacy primarily between the United States and 
Mexico, as well as between the United States and the countries in which
recent migrants typically originate. Tensions regarding escalated border 
enforcement are taken seriously by the Mexican government.37 The symbiotic
relationship between the United States and Mexico is one that should not 
be compromised, yet the United States’ escalated border enforcement efforts 
have negatively affected that relationship. 
The most viable remedy to enable foreign parties to sue for excessive
use of force in cross-border enforcement is legislative codification of such 
a right. As this Comment will discuss, both United States domestic law 
and international law are not currently sufficient for providing a remedy. 
Moreover, this Comment discusses why concerns regarding affording foreign
parties such a right are misplaced, and why it is in the best interests of the 
United States to ensure the availability of a remedy for excessive use
of force in its cross-border enforcement.
III. ANALYSIS OF RELEVANT LAW IN THE CONTEXT OF
CROSS-BORDER INCIDENTS 
A. Law in the United States 
1. The Development of Federal Case Law—From  
Possibility to Futility 
a. The Constitution and § 1983
With respect to excessive use of force claims in general, the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution is relevant.38 The Fourth 
Amendment ensures “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . .  
against unreasonable searches and seizures.”39 This right has been interpreted 
to protect against excessive use of force by federal officers,40 subject to a 
“reasonableness” standard.41 
37. See Heavey & Diaz, supra note 23. 
38. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
39. Id. 
40.  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001). 
41.  Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 774 (2014). 
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Another relevant law is Title 42, Section 1983 (“§ 1983”) of the United 
States Code.42 A party can file a civil action under § 1983 if the party 
alleges that it is deprived of constitutional rights by state or local officials.43 
Parties who are denied constitutional rights may invoke § 1983 to obtain 
an injunction or damages.44 Additionally, “[b]ecause vicarious liability is
inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each 
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, 
has violated the Constitution.”45 Thus, government agencies are not liable
for the actions of state officials under Bivens claims. 
b. Federal Case Law 
Claims for excessive use of force in cross-border enforcement are 
rooted in the principle illustrated by the United States Supreme Court in 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.46 
Bivens provides that federal courts can permit a civil cause of action for
money damages for violation of the Fourth Amendment by federal agents 
acting under color of their authority.47 Bivens thus concludes that liability 
for federal officers’ conduct lies with the federal officers themselves and not 
with the agency. Therefore, Bivens demonstrates that there is no apparent
hesitation by federal courts to prohibit damages against federal agents 
themselves.48 
Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Bivens affirmed that the Supreme Court 
has the power to “to accord damages as an appropriate remedy in the absence
of any express statutory authorization” by Congress.49 As will be elaborated
on later, the absence of a remedy is important to allowing Bivens claims 
in the context of cross-border incidents because foreign parties often have 
limited options to pursue action for cross-border shootings.50 The cause of 
action that the Court upheld in Bivens is referred to as an “implied private 
action,” meaning one that is not explicitly provided by federal law.51 The 
Supreme Court recognizes the constitutionality of invoking the Fourth 
42.  42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
43.  Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 168 (1961). 
44.  Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). 
45.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009). 
46. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 389 (1971). 
47. Id.
 48. Id. at 402. 
49.  Id. at 402 n.4. 
50. See Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 756 (9th Cir. 2018). 
51.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009). 
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Amendment for the purpose of an action against unreasonable governmental 
intrusion and thus excessive use of force by federal agents.52 
Still, there is disagreement as to whether these rights are afforded to 
those who would be deprived of them outside of the United States.53 
Accordingly, there is disagreement about whether conduct that would amount 
to a constitutional violation in the United States can amount to a constitutional 
violation if it is committed outside United States territory. In United States 
v. Verdugo-Urquidez, a Mexican citizen’s residence in Mexico was searched 
and several documents were seized without a warrant.54 The Mexican 
citizen attempted to suppress evidence acquired during the search, arguing 
that the lack of a warrant authorizing the search violated the Fourth 
Amendment.55 However, the Court interpreted the words “the people” in
the Fourth Amendment as limiting the availability of Fourth Amendment 
protection to “the people of the United States against arbitrary action by 
their own Government” rather than protection of foreign parties against 
actions by the United States government.56 The Court in Verdugo-Urquidez
thus held that Fourth Amendment rights were not afforded to foreign 
parties.57 Ultimately, Verdugo-Urquidez shows that it is not clear whether 
cross-border incidents can amount to a constitutional violation.58 Conversely,
other federal courts have interpreted “the people” as securing rights to 
foreign parties.59 
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit qualified the Supreme Court’s reasoning 
in Verdugo-Urquidez regarding the limitation of Fourth Amendment protection 
in Rodriguez v. Swartz as limited to a factual situation where an American 
agent conducts a search or seizure outside of United States territory against a 
foreign party.60 In Rodriguez, a United States border agent standing on 
United States soil shot and killed a Mexican citizen walking down a street 
52. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264. 
53. Id. at 266. 
54. Id. at 263. 
55. Id.
 56. See id. at 266. 
57. Id.
 58. Id.
59. The issue regarding who “the people” refers to was not addressed explicitly in
the Rodriguez case, but the majority implicitly made the term applicable to foreign parties 
by allowing recovery in the case for excessive use of force. See generally Rodriguez v. 
Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 2018). 
60. Id. at 731. 
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on Mexican soil.61 The court held that the border agent was subject to 
United States law because of his presence on United States soil.62 Therefore, 
instances where an American agent uses excessive, deadly force against a 
foreign party violates the Fourth Amendment rights of the foreign party.63 
The Mexican citizen’s foreign status and physical presence on Mexican
soil apparently were not circumstances detrimental to the issue of standing 
of the foreign parties.64 Rather, the Rodriguez court stressed that the ruling 
in the Verdugo-Urquidez case was not applicable in Rodriguez because 
the agent was on United States soil and thus subject to United States law.65 
Therefore, according to the majority in Rodriguez, matters of excessive use 
of force during cross-border enforcement do not pose the same concerns 
addressed in Verdugo-Urquidez.66 
Actions under Bivens are particularly relevant to cross-border actions
because the Bivens Court upheld its decision in part based on the policy 
that damages may be the only available remedy.67 An injunction would not
remedy what already happened and the United States remained immune to a 
suit in most cases, presuming that federal officers’ actions were related to 
their official duties.68 Likewise, an injunction would not remedy past
cross-border conduct and border agents may be immune to suit for actions 
carried out in their official capacities.69 
The Supreme Court, in several instances, extended the availability of 
Bivens claims beyond the factual situation in Bivens to violations of Fifth 
and Eighth Amendment rights.70 Nonetheless, noting the Supreme Court’s
changes to its treatment of these causes of action over the past several 
decades, the Court recently indicated in Ziglar v. Abbasi that expansion of the 
applicability of Bivens claims should be judicially disfavored because implied 
causes of action (such as Bivens claims) are generally disfavored.71 The 
Court in Ziglar believed that expanding Bivens claims presented separation 
of powers issues, and that the legislature is the appropriate branch to 
consider the expansion of remedies.72 Expanding the availability of remedies,
according to the Court, effectively creates new laws—a power outside the 
61. Id. at 727. 





 67. Id. at 736. 
68. Id.
 69. Id. at 734. 
70. See generally Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Carlson v. Green, 446
U.S. 14 (1980). 
71.  Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017). 
72. Id.
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proper scope of the judiciary.73 However, Ziglar did not express concern 
over the viability of Bivens claims in general, with the majority stating 
“this opinion is not intended to cast doubt on the continued force, or even 
the necessity, of Bivens in the search-and-seizure context in which it 
arose.”74 
Nonetheless, Rodriguez held that the expansion of Bivens is still 
possible despite the Supreme Court’s reluctance clearly expressed in Ziglar.75 
Rodriguez noted that the lack of explicit prohibition against expanding 
Bivens claims in Ziglar implies the possibility that Bivens could be expanded.76 
In holding such, Rodriguez emphasized Ziglar’s use of words such as
“caution” and “disfavored” as opposed to a categorical prohibition.77 
Accordingly, the Rodriguez court exercised “caution” in its expansion 
of Bivens: “We therefore cannot extend Bivens unless: (1) Rodriguez has
no other adequate alternative remedy; and (2) there are no special factors 
counseling hesitation. We now turn to those two inquiries, keeping in 
mind that extension is disfavored and that we must exercise caution.”78 In 
extending Bivens claims, the majority in Rodriguez emphasized the plaintiff’s 
lack of an adequate alternative remedy and stated that no special factors 
counseled hesitation in allowing a foreign plaintiff to sue under Bivens.79 
With respect to the relation between § 1983 and case law, although § 1983 
does not apply to federal officials,80 courts often use § 1983 by analogy in
cross-border cases, as it is useful for determining what remedies Congress 
intends to offer for constitutional violations.81 Relevant to cross-border
incidents, § 1983 states that its availability is limited to “any citizen of 
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof.”82 In his 
dissent in Rodriguez, Judge Smith stressed that this limitation should be 
interpreted literally, meaning that when § 1983 was enacted, Congress did 
73. Id.
 74. Id. at 1856. 
75.  Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 738 (9th Cir. 2018). 
76. Id.
 77. Id.
 78. Id. at 738–39. 
79. Id. at 744. 
80. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424 (1973). 
81. The Rodriguez court uses § 1983 to determine what remedies Congress implicitly 
intends to offer in cross-border incidents (i.e., whether remedies for constitutional violations 
can extend outside of United States jurisdiction for injuries abroad). See Rodriguez v. 
Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 742 (9th Cir. 2018). 
82.  42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
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not intend to provide remedies to foreign parties injured abroad, but to 
squarely preclude a party from bringing forth a Bivens claim for injuries
in Mexico.83 Further, Judge Smith questioned whether constitutional
provisions in general apply to individuals who are injured abroad.84 Such 
reasoning suggests that parties cannot sue in federal courts for injuries that 
occurred outside of United States jurisdiction, and thus prevent claims 
stemmed from injuries resulting from cross-border enforcement. 
In contrast, the majority in Rodriguez stated that it was “inconceivable” 
that Congress intended to restrict § 1983 claims “for cross-border incidents 
involving federal officials,” thus it is unlikely that that Congress consciously 
intended to limit the availability of § 1983 claims to American nationals 
in United States territory.85 According to the majority in Rodriguez, when 
§ 1983 was enacted, Congress wanted to shield local officials from constitutional 
violations in former Confederate states, which were previously not a part 
of the United States.86 Congress was also not cognizant of the unique
context of cross-border shootings between the United States and Mexico, 
and thus could not have “deliberately excluded liability for cross-border 
incidents involving federal officers.”87 In short, preclusion of remedies for 
injuries that occur abroad (and more specifically cross-border injuries) 
cannot be deduced from congressional intent behind § 1983.88 It should
be emphasized, however, that § 1983 is only relevant by analogy and not 
directly applicable to cross-border injuries. Therefore, concerns regarding 
the textual interpretation of § 1983 are not determinative of whether cross-
border incidents are subject to suit. 
The possibility of Bivens claims serving as the basis for cross-border 
incidents ultimately ended with the Supreme Court’s decision in Hernandez 
v. Mesa.89 Echoing the concerns in Ziglar, the Court held that multiple
factors warranted hesitation to expand Bivens to causes of action sourced 
in cross-border incidents.90 Specifically, national security and foreign policy
are involved, and thus expansion of remedies by adjudication involves a 
potential infringement on separation of powers.91 
83. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 755–56 (Smith, M., dissenting). 
84. See id. at 756. 
85. Id. at 742 (majority opinion). 
86. Id.
 87. Id. (internal parentheses omitted). 
88. Id.
89.  Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 739 (2020). 
90. Id.
 91. Id. 
200
NAVARROPGS (DO NOT DELETE) 1/14/2021 1:08 PM    
 









      
  
    
 









[VOL. 22:  189, 2020] Remedies for Cross-Border Incidents
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
2. Customary International Law and the Law of Nations 
Customary international law provides another potential solution. 
Customary international law refers to general international practices that 
are by operation accepted as law.92 Essentially, accepted international practices 
create legal obligations among countries to conform to such practices.93 
Unlike treaties, there are no signatories to customary international law,
and thus parties are not bound solely by becoming a signatory.94 All countries
are bound by customary international law according to accepted international 
practices.95 
There is arguably support for recognition of customary international 
law in the United States Constitution because it grants Congress the power 
“to define and punish . . . offenses against the Law of Nations”—the “Law 
of Nations” is often understood to refer to customary international law.96 
The Supreme Court also acknowledges that “domestic law of the United
States recognizes the law of nations.”97 
Although there is support indicating the legitimacy of customary 
international law within international institutions and United States domestic 
law, its enforceability in United States federal courts is disputed.98 The
Supreme Court is reluctant to recognize customary international law as a 
“private cause of action where the statute does not supply one expressly.”99 
The Supreme Court also questions the ability of federal courts to determine 
what constitutes customary international law beyond clear guidance from 
legislature (i.e., the federal courts would be left to determine what constitutes 
customary international law—a concept that may lack specificity—through 
judicial review).100 Thus, customary international law does not provide a
freestanding right that individuals may invoke as a basis for a private 
cause of action. 
92. Bart M.J. Szewczyk, Customary International Law and Statutory Interpretation: An
Empirical Analysis of Federal Court Decisions, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1118, 1120 
(2014).
93. Id.
 94. See id.
 95. See id.
96. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (emphasis added); see also Szewczyk, supra note 
92, at n.72 (“Historically, international custom was referred to as the law of nations.”). 
97.  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004). 
98. See id.
 99. Id. at 727. 
100. Id. at 729. 
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The Court’s reluctance also finds textual support in the Constitution. 
Congressional power “to define and punish” against customary international
law assumes that customary international law is punishable only after it is 
indicated by Congress as a domestic offense.101 
3. Alien Tort Statute
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) provides a cause of action in United States 
federal courts for international law violations, including customary 
international law violations.102 The ATS states that “district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.”103 However, the Supreme Court recently clarified that the ATS 
simply provides jurisdiction to “hear certain claims, but does not expressly 
provide any causes of action.”104 Therefore, under the ATS, federal courts
can only adjudicate private claims for international law violations provided 
by federal common law.105 In the absence of federal common law or 
statutory authorization, the ATS does not have extraterritorial application.106 
So because of the risk of affecting foreign policy, there is a strong
presumption against the ATS applying to conduct outside of United States 
territory.107 Federal courts are therefore largely constrained in exercising
their power to apply the ATS in extraterritorial conduct.108 
B. The Inadequacy of Laws in the United States
Current law in the United States does not provide an adequate remedy 
for cross-border incidents. With respect to case law, the Court’s recent 
ruling in Hernandez points out that the special factors consideration for 
Bivens claims is a remarkably low bar, and the extension of Bivens to 
cross-border enforcement would interfere with the political branches’ oversight 
of national security and foreign affairs.109 Hernandez also asserts that
Congress has provided causes of action for injuries that occurred abroad
in very limited instances.110 However, Hernandez does not reference the
101.  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (emphasis added). 
102.  28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
103.  Id. 
104.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115 (2013). 
105. Id.; see also Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732. 
106. See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 119. 
107. Id.
 108. Id. at 115–16. 
109.  Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 739 (2020). 
110. Id. at 16–19. 
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policies outlined in Rodriguez regarding the possibility of claims against
federal officers and its consistency with prior cases.
Although Rodriguez presents a strong case for the constitutionality of 
allowing Bivens claims for causes of action regarding cross-border excessive 
use of force, its loose ends are apparent.111 Federal officers have surely been
found liable for excessive use of force claims, but the specific context 
of cross-border enforcement suggests expanding the availability of Bivens 
claims beyond United States territory, which is a large step that warrants 
judicial caution. Allowing claims under a cross-border context is textually 
inconsistent with § 1983 claims for reasons mentioned above.112 The Rodriguez
majority’s argument for lack of Congressional intent to exclude cross-
border incidents from § 1983 claims is not persuasive. Surely, Congress 
did not conceive the application of § 1983 in the specific context of cross-
border enforcement and thus did not intentionally exclude it. However, 
the majority in Rodriguez makes no attempt to address the issue that § 1983 
seems to textually exclude claims outside of the United States. Further, 
Rodriguez does not address Ziglar’s reluctance to expand Bivens claims 
beyond the facts of Bivens itself; in fact, no attempt to compare the case 
to Bivens was made.113 
The Rodriguez majority also did not address the plaintiff’s standing.114 
The court identified that a person standing on United States soil is subject 
to the legal consequences of their actions but did not address how a foreign 
citizen has standing to sue for injury that occurred abroad.115 The majority
focused solely on the officer’s actions,116 which does not address the
international aspect of the issue. 
It is also worth mentioning that Judge Smith’s dissent in Rodriguez is 
not comprehensive. Although Judge Smith points out the restrictive nature 
of § 1983 and Congressional reluctance to extend claims abroad, the fact 
that the officer acted on United States soil is missing from his analysis.117 
Again, the federal agent’s location in the United States was crucial to the 
111. The Supreme Court did not address the deficiencies of the rationale in Rodriguez, 
so this Comment discusses such to show other deficiencies associated with pursuing a 
remedy for cross-border incidents through United States courts. 
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
113. The Ziglar case preceded the Rodriguez case. The Rodriguez court therefore 
should have the reluctance expressed by the Ziglar court. 
114.  Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2018). 
115.  Id. at 734. 
116. Id. at 732. 
117. See id. at 755–56. 
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majority’s position.118 Furthermore, when considering the availability of
Bivens claims, Judge Smith’s dissent did not address the importance of a 
plaintiff’s lack of remedy; he noted that a lack of remedy is not for the 
judiciary to address.119 Thus, by not entirely rebuking Bivens, Judge Smith’s 
analysis of Bivens claims regarding lack of remedy is arguably inconsistent. 
The Court’s recent ruling in Hernandez also brings up an important
point: extending Bivens claims to cross-border enforcement is at least in
some part relevant to foreign policy, which is consistently held to be
outside the scope of the judiciary—or, at minimum, outside the scope of
judicial actions amounting to policymaking.120  As previously mentioned,
the United States and Mexico formed a bilateral council and initiated talks 
regarding cross-border enforcement,121 signifying a connection between
foreign policy and cross-border enforcement. Thus, there is clearly a 
potential issue of infringement upon separation of powers if the judiciary 
singlehandedly offers a remedy for cross-border incidents. 
Further, Bivens claims are not free-flowing remedies and must be 
sourced in a constitutional violation. In the absence of a clear indication 
that cross-border incidents amount to a constitutional violation, Bivens claims 
are not an available remedy for cross-border incidents. The Supreme Court 
ruled out Bivens claims for Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations—the 
most relevant constitutional amendments implicated—for cross-border 
incidents.122  So at best, Bivens claims can only provide a remedy when
there is some other constitutional violation that does not counsel hesitation 
among courts.
Moreover, cross-border incidents are easily characterized as violations 
of customary international law. Killing individuals through excessive force is 
not part of customary international law.123 Such killings violate the affected
country’s sovereignty (i.e., the country’s ability to exercise control over its 
citizens) and the affected individual’s right to personhood. To the extent 
that border enforcement is generally considered an acceptable practice among 
countries, excessive enforcement denotes that the force was not proportional 
to the provoking conduct. In the context of border enforcement between 
118. Id. at 747–48. 
119. Id. at 755. 
120. See generally First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 
(1972) (indicating that courts should generally be reluctant to involve themselves in
matters that may have an effect on foreign policy, particularly where consequences of such 
involvement are impactful).
121. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 26. 
122. See generally Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020) (precluding Bivens 
claims for cross-border shootings). 
123. Roxanna Altholz, Elusive Justice: Legal Redress for Killings by U.S. Border
Agents, 27 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 1, 27 (2017). 
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the United States and Mexico, cross-border killings should not be considered 
customary to the relationship between the countries because the United 
States does not routinely engage in such acts. Assuming that cross-border 
incidents are considered violations of customary international law, an 
individual can sue only if Congress statutorily provides that such violations 
are actionable.124 But Congress has not done so. 
The ATS provides an unlikely avenue for foreign parties to successfully 
sue for cross-border incidents. Given the strong presumption against
courts allowing the ATS to reach conduct beyond the United States’ territory 
(and that occurs in another foreign sovereign’s territory), it is unlikely that 
parties will be able to sue for injuries that occur in Mexican territory. To 
the extent that cross-border incidents may be characterized as conduct in 
United States territory because of a federal agent’s presence in United 
States territory (and thus is not extraterritorial), it still involves foreign 
policy, and the Supreme Court urges federal courts to not adjudicate such 
ATS claims to prevent meddling in foreign policy.125 Furthermore, there 
are no federal common law actions to date that can serve as the basis for 
a cause of action for a cross-border incident. 
For the above-mentioned reasons, current United States law is insufficient
to provide a viable solution for cross-border incidents.126 
C. International Law
International law is relatively sparse and not easily enforceable. The 
lack of centralism and a hierarchical legislative lawmaker may be in part 
to blame for international law’s deficiencies.127 These deficiencies lead to 
laws that are “imprecise, contested, internally contradictory, overlapping, 
and subject to multiple interpretations and claims.”128 Thus, current international 
law lacks the effectiveness required to provide a proper solution to foreign 
parties in cross-border incidents. 
124. Id. at 12. 
125.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 116–17 (2013). 
126. See generally Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act
of 1988, 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (1988) (illustrating that state law and state courts are also unavailable 
as a remedy given these laws precluded states from allowing state-law suits against federal 
officers arising out of their official conduct). 
127. Jack Goldsmith et al., Comment, Law For States: International Law, Constitutional
Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1803 (2009). 
128. Id.
 205











   
 




1. United Nations Charter Article 2 
Potential ineffectiveness aside, the United Nations provides several 
provisions that are relevant to cross-border enforcement. Under the U.N. 
Charter Article 2, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations.”129 
No definitions for territorial integrity and political independence are
provided in Article 2, but territorial integrity has been interpreted as the 
protection of a state’s current borders against unilateral changes of territory 
by another country and as a concept related to political independence of a 
state.130 Further, territorial integrity refers to a recognition that a state’s
territory is the “exclusive zone in which the political independence of a 
state can find its expression and where foreign governments may not—as 
a matter of principle—interfere.”131 Accordingly, territorial interventions
violate a state’s political independence.
The scope of territorial integrity is confined to “relations between states.”132 
The concepts of territorial integrity and political independence are thought 
to be rooted in post-World War I Europe, where annexation of territory 
through external force was a threat among countries part of the former 
Ottoman Empire.133 More recently, the concept of annexation of territory 
has been related to the Russian annexation of Crimea by military force.134 
Territorial integrity and political independence under Article 2 are possibly 
related to border enforcement practices along international boundaries. A 
state’s border is the territorial extent to which it exercises its political 
independence.135 If border enforcement practices of one state extend into 
another independent state’s territory by means of force and without consent, 
then such practices are a violation of the latter country’s political independence 
over its territory. That is, the violated state’s ability to independently 
exercise governance over its territory is compromised when the aggressor 
state imposes its own matters of governance through border enforcement. 
Depending on how relations and agreements between the two states define 
129.  U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (emphasis added). 
130. Christian Marxsen, Comment, Territorial Integrity in International Law – 
Its Concept and Implications for Crimea, 75 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 7, 9–10 (2015). 
131. Id. at 10. 
132. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence
in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J 403, 405 (July 22). 
133. See Marxsen, supra note 130, at 8–9. 
134. See id.
 135. Border, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/ 
border/#print_link [https://perma.cc/3WW4-QU9A]. 
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their respective territorial integrity, there is potentially an Article 2 violation 
with cross-border enforcement. 
The United States’ cross-border enforcement practices do not clearly 
illustrate a violation of Mexico’s territorial integrity and political independence. 
Certainly, the border agents’ cross-border enforcement is not welcomed 
in Mexico, as evidenced by Mexico’s call for a full investigation when the 
United States shot tear gas into Mexico.136 Mexico’s expressed disapproval 
also suggests that Mexico does not welcome such cross-border activity.137 
Accordingly, Mexico’s ability to exercise political independence over its 
territorial borders is violated when a United States border agent in United
States territory shoots and kills a Mexican individual.
But the policy behind Article 2 Paragraph 4 is problematic to its application 
to United States cross-border enforcement. There is no indication that the 
United States intends to officially annex Mexican territory by its cross-
border enforcement and thus extend its political independence into Mexico’s 
territory. Policy reasons will therefore likely preclude a determination that 
the United States violates Article 2 Paragraph 4 of the U.N. Charter with
cross-border enforcement.
2. The United Nations Charter and Relevant State Powers 
Articles 39 and 40 of the United Nations Charter are also potentially
relevant for cross-border incidents. Article 39 states in part that “[t]he
Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations,
or decide what measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore international 
peace and security.”138 Article 40 states the following: 
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may,
before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for
in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional
measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be
without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The 
136. See Heavey & Diaz, supra note 23. 
137. See Paulina Villegas & Alan Yuhas, Mexico Calls on U.S. to Investigate Use of 
Tear Gas at Border, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/03/ 
world/americas/mexico-border-tear-gas-investigation.html [https:// perma.cc/TKT9-SXKX]. 
138.  U.N. Charter art. 39. 
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Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional 
measures.139  
Taken together, when the Security Council determines a breach of peace 
or act of aggression, the Council should attempt to maintain or restore 
peace and should call upon parties to comply with provisional measures 
when peace is not preserved. Then, if a state still does not comply with 
the Council’s provisional measures, Articles 41 and 42 enable the Council 
to take action by force, such as by economic or physical disruption.140 
The Security Council is comprised of fifteen member states, five of 
which are permanent members.141 The United States is among the five 
permanent member states.142 Under Article 27(3) of the United Nations
Charter, permanent members of the Council have a veto power over 
decisions on substantive matters because decisions of the Council must 
have “the concurring votes of the permanent members.”143 Thus, the United
States, as well as other permanent members, has the power to veto any 
substantive matters. 
Even if cross-border enforcement amounts to a threat or breach of peace 
by the Security Council under Article 39, the Security Council, which the 
United States is a part of, exercises discretion as to what measures should 
be taken to address the issue.144 The United States’ permanent membership
in the Council makes it doubtful that it would vote to take action against 
itself for its own conduct. Therefore, recourse under the Security Council 
is inadequate to solve the excessive use of force by United States border 
agents.
For the above-mentioned reasons, provisions under the United Nations 
Charter do not provide a viable remedy for cross-border incidents. 
3. The Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court 
The Rome Statute also provides an inadequate solution for cross-border 
incidents. The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), which retains jurisdiction over matters related to “genocide, crimes
139.  U.N. Charter art. 40. 
140.  U.N. Charter art. 41, 42. 




143.  U.N. Charter art. 27(3). 
144.  U.N. Charter art. 39. 
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against humanity, war crimes, and state aggression” in general.145 The Rome
Statute is “limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole,” where perpetrators should not escape punishment.146 
“Ordinary” human rights violations, such as those that are not universally 
abhorrent, typically do not qualify as serious crimes for purposes of the 
Rome Statute.147 Although there does not appear to be a clear distinction 
between serious or ordinary human rights violations, the policy behind the 
Rome Statute is clear: it does not apply to every human rights violation. 
To the extent that excessive use of force in cross border enforcement 
may be subject to the Rome Statute (in part because of its policy to promote 
remedies for parties and to prevent evasion of punishment), the Rome Statute 
recognizes “[t]he search and seizure right to privacy” as an internationally 
recognized human right.148 The right against excessive use of force thus
has an actionable basis under the Rome Statute. 
Mexico is a signatory to the Rome Statute, but the United States is not.149 
Therefore, the ICC has limited jurisdiction over the United States, and 
jurisdiction over non-signatories is largely reserved for non-signatory 
countries who have committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
genocide.150 Although excessive uses of force in cross-border shootings
are grave occurrences, it is doubtful that the ICC will exercise jurisdiction 
over the United States for cross-border incidents. Moreover, the ICC 
is often considered a court of last resort and grants deference to member 
states to investigate and prosecute international law violations without the 
court’s intervention.151 Therefore, the fact that excessive use of force causes
of action can potentially be tried in United States courts makes it even less 
likely that the ICC will exercise jurisdiction over the United States for 
such cases. 
145. G.E. Edwards, International Human Rights Law Challenges to the New 
International Criminal Court: The Search and Seizure Right to Privacy, 26 YALE J. INT’L 
L. 323, 325 (2001). 
146. The Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, art. 5(1), U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998). 
147. Edwards, supra note 145, at 326. 
148. Id. at 327. 
149. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Treaty Collection,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XVIII/XVIII-
10.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/FJL4-ZQT6]. 
150. See The Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, art. 12(2), U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998). 
151. Id.
 209







   
 
 











     
Lastly, the ICC only offers criminal prosecution for people who violate 
its laws as a solution.152 Assuming successful prosecution against federal 
officers for cross-border incidents under the ICC, there is nonetheless no 
compensation for the affected private parties. Because civil suits would 
best remedy the affected parties, successful prosecution of federal officers 
by the ICC would not provide an adequate remedy.153 
4. Customary International Law Under the United Nations
In addition to domestic law in the United States, customary international
law is also codified in Article 38 of the United Nations’ Statute of The
International Court of Justice (ICJ), which states that the ICJ has jurisdiction 
over “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law” and “the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.”154 
Although violations of customary international law fall within the 
jurisdiction of the ICJ, it is unlikely that pursuing any claims against
federal officers in the ICJ will lead to much success. The United States largely 
objects to fully submitting itself to the ICJ’s authority and often reacts negatively
to rulings that are seemingly counter to United States interests.155 
Collectively, the United Nations, the ICC, and customary international
law do not provide adequate solutions for cross-border incidents. 
5. Bilateral Treaties and International Agreements 
Another potential remedy is a bilateral treaty or international agreement. In 
the United States, treaties are proposed by the President “by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate . . . provided two-thirds of the Senators 
present concur.”156 Treaties in the United States are considered to be as 
authoritative as federal legislation.157 
A bilateral treaty between the United States and Mexico could provide 
an adequate remedy for cross-border incidents if it restricts federal officers
152. See Catherine Gegout, The International Criminal Court: Limits, Potential and
Conditions for the Promotion of Justice and Peace, THIRD WORLD Q. (June 24, 2013),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2013.800737 
[https://perma.cc/27LE-VR3K].
153. See discussion infra Section V (for a discussion regarding why civil remedies 
best serve affected parties). 
154. Statute of The International Criminal Court of Justice art. 38, ¶ 1, Apr. 18, 1946, 
33 U.S.T. 993. 
155. See Sean D. Murphy, The United States and the International Court of Justice:
Coping with Antinomies, in THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 
1, 2 (Cesare Romano, ed., 2008). 
156. CONG. RSCH. SERV., 106TH CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 27 (Comm. Print 2001). 
157. Id. at 1. 
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from using excessive force and provides an avenue for plaintiffs to bring 
a cause of action, irrespective of foreign status or presence on Mexican
soil at the time of injury.
The United States and Mexico recently entered into an agreement in 
June 2019, whereby the United States and Mexico facilitated cooperation 
to handle the border crisis.158 Although the agreement is bilateral and
considered “burden-sharing,” it largely shifts the burden of migrant 
management and enforcement upon Mexico.159 It also gives the United
States much discretion to assess the sufficiency of and amend measures 
taken by Mexico.160 
Neither international agreements nor treaties provide adequate solutions.
International agreements, such as the joint resolution recently entered into 
by the United States and Mexico, are essentially diplomatic arrangements
that do not have a substantive effect on creating a source of actionable rights.
Bilateral treaties are considered binding under international law,161 
where enforceability is too uncertain to provide a viable avenue for claims 
for excessive use of force in cross-border incidents. Once a bilateral treaty 
is made, it is then subject to the legislature to fulfill the obligations sourced 
in the terms of the agreement.162 The legislative stage of treaty creation is
subject to legislative modification, whereby modification might not follow 
the explicit terms of the agreement, provided that the Senate advises 
otherwise.163 Thus, before a treaty is legally enforceable, its terms undergo 
semi-conventional legislative processes, which could create legislation that 
does not comport with the terms of the original treaty. Ultimately, the procedural 
processes of treaties create an additional stage prior to enforceability that 
may give false hope that the treaty terms originally agreed upon are binding. 
Unlike other potential solutions, there may be benefits to bilateral treaties 
and international agreements entered into between the United States and 
Mexico regarding claims for cross-border enforcement. Unlike law that is 
purely internationally sourced, treaties and agreements give parties a chance 
to directly negotiate terms, which would otherwise be unavailable under 
international legislation. This option benefits Mexico due to their ability
158. See generally Joint Declaration and Supplementary Agreement Between the
United States of America and Mexico, Mex.-U.S., June 7, 2019, 19 U.S.T. 607. 
159. Id.
 160. Id.
 161. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 156, at 12. 
162.  Id. 
 163. See id.
 211




    
   
   
      
 
 





to provide terms advantageous to its citizens. It may also benefit the
United States more than a purely domestic legislative solution because
allowing claims for excessive use of force is itself a beneficial term to
Mexico, enabling the United States to negotiate for other terms beneficial 
to itself. Treaties and agreements may therefore be a “win-win” for both 
the United States and Mexico, and thus a potentially excellent solution. 
However, as previously stated, there are numerous practical issues 
associated with treaties. The legislative process may undercut terms of the 
agreement if the Senate advises against the original terms. In such an event, 
cross-border excessive use of force claims might not withstand, causing 
further strain between United States and Mexico relations. Additionally, 
because most migrants in recent years have originated from El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras,164 it is likely that these governments would 
also want to partake in negotiations to vouch for terms beneficial to their 
citizens. Nonetheless, adding more countries to negotiations would further 
complicate the matter and create wider international issues if terms of the 
agreement change in the legislative process or if enforceability of the 
terms is insufficient. 
IV. SOLUTIONS
Rather than acquiesce to the unviability of current laws, it is necessary 
to implement a solid, withstanding solution for cross-border incidents for
the policy reasons previously mentioned. Before offering a solution, it is 
important to address and rebut potential concerns with permanently
establishing a remedy for international parties for cross-border incidents. 
These rebuttals collectively show that providing such remedy is largely
uncontroversial. 
A. Providing a Legislative Remedy Does Not Violate 
Separation of Powers 
One concern consistently mentioned by federal courts with respect to 
enabling actions against border enforcement officials is the possibility of 
infringement upon traditional notions of separation of powers. The Supreme 
Court has long recognized that “[t]he President is the constitutional 
representative of the United States with regard to foreign nations.”165 At 
the extreme of this view, some believe that the “President is the sole organ 
of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign 
164. CAPPS ET AL., supra note 13, at 12. 
165.  United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). 
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nations.”166 Accordingly, an act of Congress relating to foreign relations
edges towards compromising the constitutionally-sourced separation between 
the executive and legislative branches of government. 
This concern understandably extends to cross-border incidents. Instrumental 
to its cautionary policy, the Court’s recent ruling in Hernandez noted the 
importance of recognizing a strict interpretation of the separation-of-powers 
principle.167 Hernandez noted that the case concerned national security 
and foreign policy.168 The Court essentially echoed its concerns in Ziglar, 
where judicial inquiry into national security matters “raises ‘concerns for 
the separation of powers in trenching on matters committed to the other 
branches.’”169 According to the Court in Hernandez, matters of national
security should be left solely to the executive and legislative branches and 
free from judicial inquiry in most cases. 
It is worth mentioning that it is unclear whether instances of excessive
use of force in cases of cross-border enforcement are clearly tied to national 
security as opposed to general foreign policy, the latter of which may find 
greater support. An excessive use of force in cross-border enforcement 
may also lessen the likelihood that a seizure or confinement was truly 
executed for the sake of national security. The Rodriguez court noted this 
when it distinguished cross-border enforcement from national security, 
stating “no one suggests that national security involves shooting people 
who are just walking down a street in Mexico.”170 Recognition that a use
of force was excessive inherently denotes that the use of force was not 
proportionate, for the sake of national security or for any other matter. 
But even stipulating that excessive uses of force along the border are 
considered matters of national security, if the legislative branch provides 
the source for cross-border enforcement remedies, then the potential issues
related to separation of powers are eliminated. The unlikelihood that such
claims will be considered matters of national security should thus prevent
Congress from characterizing codification of a remedy as counter to national 
security.
Lastly, because excessive use of force in cross-border enforcement can
be characterized as violating customary international law, Congress has 
166. See 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1799). 
167. See Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 735 (2020). 
168. See id.
169. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1861 (2017) (quoting Christopher v. Harbury,
536 U. S. 403, 417 (2002)). 
170.  Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 745 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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textual power to create laws regarding such enforcement. Again, Congress 
can legislatively define and devise punishments for violations of customary
international law.171 Regardless of concerns regarding national security 
and separation of powers more generally, Congress independently possesses 
the power to create a law prohibiting excessive cross-border enforcement 
and providing remedies to those who suffer from such violations. 
B. Providing a Remedy Will Not Invite More or Frivolous Claims 
A general policy concern associated with allowing foreign parties to 
bring claims for cross-border enforcement is the potential for more suits 
or entirely frivolous suits. Under this concern, codifying a remedy for foreign 
parties may even condone claims against border enforcement officials, 
potentially delegitimizing the actions of such officials. This concern is rooted 
in the inherently contentious nature of cross-border enforcement, where 
stringent border enforcement is considered necessary by some.172 Since 
2007, Border Patrol agents have experienced 6,000 assaults resulting in 
three agent deaths.173 Agents have also been confronted with projectile rocks 
1,713 times since 2010.174 Statistics aside, cross-border issues are generally 
highly contentious within the United States political sphere.175 Given this
atmosphere, there may be concern that any injury resulting from border 
enforcement will lead to a claim against federal officers, frivolous and 
non-frivolous alike. 
Frivolous claims will likely not be successful under an adequate solution.
Remedies would be limited to instances where such enforcement is necessarily
excessive and disproportionate. Because this remedy would be modeled
after comparable remedies afforded by Bivens claims and by Fourth 
Amendment claims generally, frivolous claims would likely be sorted
out by pleading standards. Thus, in instances where officers are physically
assaulted or have legitimate apprehension for their safety, even the most
stringent enforcement might not be considered excessive given the discretion
that law enforcement officers are often afforded. This prevents the actions 
of federal officers in these situations from amounting to an excessive use
171. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
172. Matthew Feeney, Walling Off Liberty: How Strict Immigration Enforcement 
Threatens Privacy and Local Policing, CATO INST. (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.cato.org/ 
publications/policy-analysis/walling-liberty-how-strict-immigration-enforcement-threatens- 
privacy [https://perma.cc/9YPJ-YYHQ].
173.  Memorandum from Michael J. Fisher, supra note 24. 
174. Id.
 175. See Jeffrey M. Jones, New High in U.S. Say Immigration Most Important 
Problem, GALLUP (June 21, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/259103/new-high-say-
immigration- important-problem.aspx [https://perma.cc/8BXD-BXTS]. 
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of force, thus preventing the possibility for remedy in such instances. To
the extent that there may be claims where it is uncertain whether an officer
exercised excessive force, possibly resulting in more claims, the determination 
will be left to a jury in the same manner as excessive use of force claims 
outside of the border enforcement context.
Enabling claims for excessive enforcement does not amount to an 
endorsement by the United States government to bring claims against its 
officers. As noted in Rodriguez, border agents have faced Bivens claims 
for Fourth Amendment violations in the past, so holding agents liable is 
not an entirely unprecedented remedy.176 The argument that allowing these
claims will amount to a new endorsement of action against federal agents 
is weakened by agents’ liability in the past. Generally, federal agents have 
also been subject to civil suits in the past and courts have not indicated that 
remedies in such instances amount to endorsement or encouragement of 
actions against the government. The context of cross-border enforcement 
does not change this analysis because federal agents have already been 
subject to lawsuits in the past—this solution merely expands the possibility 
of instances where individuals may bring forth action.
Further, even if there are more claims in general, this is not an issue of 
much magnitude. Expanding potential sources of excessive use of force
claims does not clearly open the floodgates to more claims because instances 
of excessive uses of force in cross-border enforcement are not common. 
C. Providing a Remedy Will Not Prevent Agents from 
Performing Assigned Duties 
Another potential concern associated with allowing claims for cross-
border enforcement is that it will prevent border agents from performing
their assigned duties. That is, the actions of border agents will be subject
to lawsuits for conduct that is an essential part of an agent’s duty, thus
limiting their ability to perform essential duties. 
But this concern shares the same faults with the previous concern. Claims
will be limited to instances where use of force was excessive. Legitimate,
non-excessive actions by border agents will not be the subject of successful 
claims. Law enforcement, including border agents, have long been subject 
to claims for excessive use of force, yet such actions have not categorically
prevented law enforcement agents from performing their duties. There is
176.  Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 746 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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no indication, and it is doubtful that any court would attempt to make the 
argument, that excessive uses of force are an essential part of a law 
enforcement officer’s duty. In fact, Judge Smith’s dissent in Rodriguez 
also suggested that excessive uses of force by officers are generally not 
protected under the Constitution.177  
Likewise, in Harris v. Roderick, it was clarified that law enforcement 
officers enjoy qualified immunity.178 But inherent in the concept of qualified 
immunity is the “balance between the rights of persons residing in this 
country to be free from blatant constitutional violations and the need 
to ensure that the larger needs of society are met and that law enforcement 
personnel are not unnecessarily diverted from their duties.”179 The established 
principle of qualified immunity ensures that officers are not subject to liability 
for performing their assigned duties but are also not free to blatantly 
violate the Constitution. Further, qualified immunity precedes an action, 
as it is considered immunity from suit and not a defense to liability after 
a lawsuit has been filed.180  It is therefore not possible for plaintiffs to sue 
for excessive use of force, thereby clogging federal dockets, with the hope 
that a qualified immunity defense does not work during litigation. 
In fact, ensuring the availability of these types of claims would likely 
incentivize officers to be more cautious in their on-duty behavior and thereby
deter future excessive cross-border enforcement, as suggested by both the 
majority and minority opinions in the Rodriguez case.181 
D. A Remedy Sourced in the Legislature is the Most
Proper and Durable Remedy 
Legislative action is the last option for providing a firm solution to 
excessive use of force in cross-border enforcement. Current international 
law is too vague and discretionary to offer a viable solution.182 Additionally, 
judicial resistance to ruling on anything that resembles policymaking renders 
the viability of Bivens claims as uncertain and unlikely. Thus, the most 
apparent and viable solution is for Congress to pass a statute which codifies 
the ability of foreign parties to sue for excessive use of force. 
The proposed legislation should prohibit excessive uses of force in cross-
border enforcement similar to the rights ensured by the Fourth Amendment.
177. See id. at 757. 
178.  Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1200 (9th Cir. 1997). 
179. Id. (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813–14 (1982)). 
180. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 772 (2014). 
181. See generally Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 757. 
182. The inadequacies of international law in providing an effective solution to
cross-border incidents show that the proposed solution would not be as effective if sourced 
in international law. 
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Accordingly, the legislation will likely not provide remedies for all injuries
occurred during cross-border enforcement, but only for those that were 
caused by excessive uses of force. Although the legislation is largely intended 
to solve the procedural issues related to the inability of foreign parties
(i.e., non-United States citizens) to sue for injuries that occur outside
of the United States jurisdiction, this legislation does not need to exclude 
domestic parties for injuries that occur abroad.183 
The remedy best takes the form of a civil suit for monetary damages,
similar to Bivens claims. Such remedy would enable private parties to recover 
monetary damages for cross-border incidents. Given that the parties may
be foreign, criminal prosecution in the United States may not provide feelings
of adequate justice for rogue agents. Also, the political implications 
surrounding cross-border enforcement make it unlikely that the United States 
government would criminally prosecute border agents if their conduct is 
even tangentially related to their assigned duties.
United States law currently recognizes the possibility of foreign parties 
to bring suit for excessive force, as evidenced in Rodriguez v. Swartz.184 
Thus, legislation that codifies such a remedy is not unprecedented. The policy 
concerns discussed above should dispel any hesitation for Congressional
enactment of this remedy.
Furthermore, the uncertainty that lies with applying constitutional rights 
across international borders is generally not an issue with the application 
of legislation. It is a longstanding principle that Congress may enforce its 
laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States.185 This resolves 
whether the issue is cross-border enforcement is a matter of foreign policy 
that only the executive branch has the power to address, or whether the issue 
should not be remedied by the judiciary. Therefore, if Congress passes a law 
ensuring the ability of foreign parties to bring suit in United States federal 
courts, the possibility that such legislation extends to parties beyond the 
territorial boundaries of the United States is not an unprecedented remedy, 
but rather is a long-recognized one. 
183. The extent to which such an injury occurs may be limited; however, because
the proposed legislation is intended to solve procedural issues, the legislation should also 
apply to United States citizens (and other parties who usually do not face procedural issues 
in filing lawsuits) for injuries occurred abroad as a result of cross-border enforcement. 
184. The recent Supreme Court ruling in Hernandez did not specifically take issue 
with the appellant’s foreign status. Rodriguez, 899 F.3d at 738. 
185. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
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Congress’s ability to create laws that define and punish violations of
customary international law indicates its ability to do so for excessive
cross-border enforcement. It also indicates that if any remedy is to be
offered for excessive cross-border enforcement, the legislature is the proper 
branch to provide such remedy. Even if cross-border incidents do not qualify 
as violations of customary international law, they still create tension between 
the United States and Mexico.186 
There are procedural advantages in a legislative sourced a remedy for 
cross-border incidents. Concerns related to whether cross-border incidents 
amount to a constitutional violation do not pose a problem for Congressional
action. Congress can provide a remedy irrespective of whether the conduct is
unconstitutional.187 
V. CONCLUSION
As discussed earlier, policy reasons guide the need for providing a 
solution for excessive use of force during cross-border incidents. Cross-
border incidents have gained attention and condemnation from numerous 
countries and multinational actors. These incidents can potentially create 
further tension between the United States and Mexico if substantive action
to remedy the issue is not taken. 
While cross-border incidents are certainly condemnable, it is uncertain
whether United States federal courts can provide adequate remedies for
cross-border incidents in the absence of relevant legislation. Issues arise
regarding the ability of foreign parties injured on foreign soil to bring forth 
such claims. International law also does not provide adequate remedies to 
address these claims. 
Instead of balking at the unavailability of remedies within United States 
and international law, action must occur to address and provide adequate
remedies for cross-border incidents. Legislative remedies for cross-border
incidents find textual support within the United States’ legal framework and 
are subject to the least concerns and uncertainties. Thus, a legislative remedy 
in the form of allowing private affected parties to bring civil claims for 
excessive cross-border enforcement is the most adequate in ensuring that 
this contentious issue does not evolve into one that can no longer be solved.
186. See generally Dickerson, supra note 12. 
187.  It is nonetheless helpful to consider what rights are afforded by the Fourth 
Amendment as an indication of what rights should be granted to those affected by excessive 
cross-border enforcement. As discussed in other sections, issues relating to whether 
a constitutional violation has occurred mainly depends on how the Constitution applies 
abroad, which only poses a procedural issue. These issues do not address the substantive 
issue of whether excessive use of force was used. 
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